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THE TRADE FACILITATION AGREEMENT: BUILDING FAITH IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN AN UNCERTAIN TIME
Ashley KincaidLloyd*
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is often theorized that multilateral trade can act as a stabilizing conduit for
peace despite tumultuous governments, economic crisis, or social unrest.
Facilitating such trade in a pragmatic multilateral way has been a challenging
project, but on February 22, 2017, the groundbreaking Trade Facilitation
Agreement (TFA) entered into force. 2 The TFA is "the first new multilateral
agreement in the nearly twenty-year history" of the World Trade Organization

(WTO).3
"Trade facilitation" is defined by the United Nations Economic Commission
for Europe (UNECE) with the United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and
Electronic Business (UN/CEFACT) as "the simplification, standardization and
harmonization of procedures and associated information flows" required to move
goods from seller to buyer and to make payment.' In the WTO context, trade
facilitation primarily refers to reforming "border management processes so as to
make import and export transactions more transparent, predictable and efficient."'
Bernard Hoekman states, "[a]n even broader view of trade facilitation is to include

*Ashley Kincaid Lloyd, 2017 J.D. Graduate of the University of Denver, Sturm College of Law.
1.

The WTO Can... Contribute to Peace and Stability, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,

https://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis e/l0thi e/10thi09_e.htm [hereinafter The WTO Can]
("When the world economy is in turmoil, the multilateral trading system can contribute to stability.
Some would argue that this can even contribute to international peace. History is littered with examples
of trade disputes escalating into armed conflict. It's a claim that should not be exaggerated, but there is
truth in it. If we understand why, we have a clearer picture of what the system actually does.").
2. WTO's Trade FacilitationAgreement Enters Into Force, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,

https://www.wto.org/english/news e/newsl7_e/fac_31janl7_e.htm.
3. Chapter II: The World Trade Organization, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE,

https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Chapter/o20ll%20The%20World%2OTrade%200rganization.pdf;

see

also Advance Trade Facilitation, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Sept. 15, 2016, 10:30 AM),
https://www.uschamber.com/issue-brief/advance-trade-facilitation
("Its
formal
adoption
on
Thanksgiving Day 2014 made it the first multilateral trade agreement reached since the WTO's

founding.").
4. UNECE
with
UN/CEFACT,
TRADE
FACILITATION
IMPLEMENTATION
GUIDE,
http://tfig.unece.org/contents/org-unece-with-uncefact.htm.
5. Bernard Hoekman, The Bali Trade Facilitation Agreement and Rulemaking in the WTO:

Milestone,
Mistake
or Mirage? 4
(EUL
Working
Papers
RSCAS
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/33031/RSCAS_2014_102.pdfseque%20nce=1.
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any measure that promotes trade." 6 Trade facilitation, generally, is "now widely
considered a necessary complement to broader economic liberalization-essential
to reap [trade facilitation's] full benefits."'
One of the most beneficial aspects of trade facilitation is that it creates
stability in markets and thus certainty and confidence in traders, importers, and
exporters.' Extensive empirical data at this time exists to suggest trade facilitation
can significantly boost trade, "diversification along the extensive margin of trade,
and increase aggregate welfare."' Arguably, the TFA has far reaching effects, one
is superseding the negative effects of high, as "trade facilitation has a larger effect
than removing tariffs.""o If one is inclined to embrace trade facilitation and accept
the theory that trade at least encourages peace between nations, the TFA may be
interpreted as a manifestation of the foregoing intuition that trade creates peace.
Moreover, because the WTO's allows states to retaliate against any state that
violates WTO agreements, and as the TFA is the first agreement that all WTO
members signed, there are binding and legal repercussions that make the TFA
indisputably unique.
This Article is comprised of the following sections: (II) background of the
TFA's creation; (III) the ways in which protectionism hinders trade facilitation;
(IV) a discussion of the TFA including: (A) its projected benefits, (B) the role of
the Global Alliance, (C) implementing the TFA, and (D) regulating and enforcing
the TFA despite protectionism in 2017; (V) non-protectionist critiques of the TFA;
and (VI) concludes that the TFA will serve a significant purpose.
II.

BACKGROUND

The WTO created the TFA as a natural consequence of the WTO's work. This

6. Id.
7.

Note by the Secretariat, Developmental Aspects of the DOHA Round of Negotiations,

WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.5 (Oct. 29, 2010), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueldList--93870,88383,27224,56064,57970&CurrentCatalogueldndex=
0&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True.
8. See generally, C. Zaki, An empirical assessment of the trade facilitation initiative.
econometric evidence and global economic effects, 13 WORLD TRADE REVIEW 103-130 (January
2014); see also Hoekman, supra note 5, at 4-5.
9. Hoekman, supranote 5, at 5; see generally Chad P. Brown & Douglas A. Irwin, The GATT's
Stating

Point:

Tarif

Levels

circa

1947

(POLICY

RESEARCH

WORKING

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/935351468193733666/pdf/WPS7649.pdf.
Economic
10. Enabling Trade: Valuing Growth Opportunities, World

PAPER),

Forum,

http://reports.weforum.org/global-enabling-trade-2013/a-reducing-supply-chain-barriers-to-trade-couldincrease-gdp-up-to-six-times-more-than-removing-tariffs-they-have-been-under-managed-by-bothcountries-and-companies/#view/fn-6 ("While the increases in trade from tariff elimination are similar in
magnitude to those associated with trade facilitation, the increases in GDP are many times greater. The

reason is that the kinds of efficiencies brought about by improved trade facilitation are more powerful
than those associated with tariff reduction. Reductions in supply chain barriers improve the efficiency
of the movement of goods, in a manner analogous to an increase in transportation productivity, thereby
recovering resources that are otherwise wasted. In contrast, tariff reductions primarily represent a
reallocation of resources within an economy, while capturing only the more modest inefficiency created

by the tax.").
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section will summarize the WTO's history from its inception, through the Doha
Development Agenda discussions, and finally to the Bali Ministerial Conference
that culminated in the TFA's creation and entry into force. The WTO is an
intergovernmental organization (IGO)" created in 1995 in Geneva, Switzerland. 12
Its creation arose from the Uruguay Round Agreement, 3 but its establishment
occurred through Article 1 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organizations' entry into force.' 4 At the WTO's inaugural Ministerial Conference
in 1996, trade facilitation discussions arose as a top priority.' 5 Trade increased
presumably from the certainty that the WTO rules provided for businesses and
countries. The rules also had positive effect on equality.1 6 The WTO held ten
Ministerial Conferences to date, with an eleventh scheduled for December 2017 in
Buenos Aries, Argentina.' 7
The Doha Conference was a landmark decision that paved the way for the
TFA's creation. Controversy arising from popular movements against

11. Intergovernmental
Organizations
(IGOs),
HARVARD
LAW
SCHOOL,
http://hls.harvard.edu/dept/opia/what-is-public-interest-law/public-service-practice-settings/publicintemational-law/intergovernmental-organizations-igos/ ("The main purposes of IGOs were to create a
mechanism for the world's inhabitants to work more successfully together in the areas of peace and
security, and also to deal with economic and social questions. In this current era of increasing
globalization and interdependence of nations, IGOs have come to play a very significant role in
international political systems and global governance.")
12. The
WTO,
WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/thewto e.htm (also known as the Marrakesh Agreement).
13. Uruguay Round Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, WORD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.org/english/docse/legale/04wto e.htm.
14. Id.
15. The
First
WTO
Ministerial
Conference,
WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min96_e/min96e.htm ("Trade, foreign, finance and
agriculture Ministers from more than 120 World Trade Organization Member governments and from

those in the process of acceding to the WTO participated in a Ministerial Conference in Singapore from
9 to 13 December 1996. The Conference was the first since the WTO entered into force on 1 January
1995."); see also Hoekman, supra note 5, at 4 (stating the WTO's interest in Trade Facilitation arose
from the international business community's concerns that product sharing and global sourcing suffered
as a result of "inefficient border management procedures and controls.").

16. World

Trade

Organization,

Ministerial

Declaration

of

13

December

1996,

WT/MIN(96)/DEC,
1 2, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/minist e/min96_e/wtodec e.htm
(Moreover, the Singapore Ministerial Declaration iterated the WTO's intent "to make the most of the

possibilities that the multilateral system provides to promote sustainable growth and development while
contributing to a more stable and secure climate in international relations.").
17. See
generally
Ministerial
Conferences,
WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/minist-e/minist-e.htm (Second: "Geneva, Switzerland between

18 and 20 May 1998"; third: "Seattle, Washington State, US between 30 November and
3 December 1999"; fourth "Doha, Qatar from 9 to 14 November 2001"; fifth: Cancin, Mexico from
10 to 14 September 2003"; sixth: "Hong Kong, China, 13-18 December 2005"; seventh: "Geneva,
Switzerland, took place from 30 November to 2 December 2009"; eighth: "Geneva, Switzerland, from

15 to 17 December 2011"; ninth "Bali, Indonesia, from 3 to 7 December 2013"; and tenth: "Nairobi,
Kenya, from 15 to 19 December 2015."); see also Eleventh WTO Ministerial Conference, WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/mc 11 e/mc II-e.htm.
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"megacorporations" prior to 200118 did not deter the WTO from continuing to
19
strive towards its goals to work on efficient trade facilitation. To this end, the
WTO members attending the Doha Round focused on reducing import taxes, or
20
"tariffs", on a variety of trade goods. The Trade Negotiations Committee had
leadership and a mission to begin crafting trade facilitation among WTO members.
Following the Canctin Conference, "WTO members formally agreed to launch
negotiations on trade facilitation in July 2004," based upon Annex D: Modalities
for Negotiations on Trade Facilitation (Modalities), included in the July
Package.2 1 The Modalities also directed WTO members to improve and clarify
freedom of transit, "fees and formalities connected with importation and
22
exportation[,]" and ways to publish and administer trade regulations.
The United States found India and China's agricultural policies
"unconscionable", 2 3 and this breakdown frustrated many WTO members.

18. Paige McClanahan, Doha Round Trade Talks- Explainer, GUARDIAN (Sept. 3, 2012,
10:17AM),

https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/sep/03/doha-round-trade-talks-

explainer ("The activists feared the talks would let big corporations plunder the economies of the
developing world, restrict poor countries' access to affordable drugs and prevent developing nations
from protecting their domestic economic interests."); see also Derek Brown, The Battle in Seattle,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 1999, 1:14PM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/1999/dec/01/1; Timeline:
NEWS,
BBC
Organization,
Trade
World
(In 1999, over 30,000 protesters
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/2430089.stm

disrupted WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle, Washington.).
ORGANIZATION,
TRADE
WORLD
Do,
We
19. What
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/what we doe.htm (The Doha Round concluded the

Doha Development Agenda, which was the "first to focus on helping developing countries join the
global marketplace, and boost their economies as a result. Moreover, the Doha Round articulated its

underlying philosophy of creating a "Single Undertaking" such that "nothing is agreed until everything
is agreed" regarding Trade Facilitation.").
20. Tariff, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tariff.asp (A "Tariff' is "A
tax imposed on imported goods and services. Tariffs are used to restrict trade, as they increase the price
of imported goods and services, making them more expensive to consumers."); see also McClanahan,
supra note 18.

21. Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the General Council on I August 2004,
D-1,
p.
10,
para.
D.
Annex
WT/U579,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dda e/ddadraft 31jul04_e.pdf (The Modalities specifically
addressed how to begin negotiating Trade Facilitation by requiring the Trade Negotiations Committee
to establish a Negotiating Group and appoint its Chair to plan and schedule negotiations); Id section g,
p. 3 ("taking note of the work done on trade facilitation by the Council for Trade in Goods under the
mandate in paragraph 27 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and the work carried out under the
auspices of the General Council both prior to the Fifth Ministerial Conference and after its conclusion,
the General Council decides by explicit consensus to commence negotiations on the basis of the
modalities set out in Annex D to this document.").
ORGANIZATION,
TRADE
22. Early years - from Singapore to Doha, WORLD
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/tradfa_e/tradfa intro e.htm ("Under this mandate, members are

directed to clarify and improve GATT Article V (Freedom of Transit), Article VIII (Fees and
Formalities

connected

with

Importation

and

Exportation),

and

Article

X

(Publication

and

Administration of Trade Regulations)" ... Shortly thereafter, on October 12, 2004, "the Trade
Negotiations Committee established the Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation and appointed
Ambassador Muhamad Noor of Malaysia as its Chairperson.").
23. Alan Beattie & Frances Williams, Doha Trade Talks Collapse, FINANCIAL TIMES (July 29,
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However, there was optimism. 24 The tone surrounding the Doha Agenda in 2012
and 2013 drastically changed. 25 Members, through alliances or individually,
submitted hundreds of proposals for the Negotiating Group to consider. 26 At the
2013 Bali Ministerial Conference, Members worked collectively to complete the
Bali Package, which included the TFA.2 7 Finally, after years of disagreement and
months of the Negotiating Group's revisions, the Bali proposals became the TFA's
final text.2 8 The momentum that began in Bali continued through to the 2015
Ministerial Conference in Kenya. At the Kenya Round, "WTO members agreed on
several significant issues within the Doha Development Agenda and outlined the
way forward in WTO negotiations." 29 Within two short years, the TFA entered into
force on February 22, 2017.30

III.

PROTECTIONISM ADVERSELY AFFECTS TRADE FACILITATION

Historically, any given state was skeptical of trusting its trade partners to have
perpetually open markets and instead opted for "protectionism."' Protectionism
refers to governmental efforts to restrict international trade.3 2 The Great

2008), https://www.ft.com/content/0638a320-5d8a-l ldd-8129-000077b07658 (India and China
believed protected its impoverished domestic farmers from external agricultural import surges, but the
United States disagreed.); see also McClanahan, supra note 18 (Susan Schwab also suggested if the
United States had relented to India and China "we could have come out with an outcome that rolled the
global trading system back three years, or five years, or 30 years: 30 years of progress."); Heather
Stewart, Tariffs: WTO talks collapse after India and China clash with America over farm products,
GUARDIAN (July 20, 2008, 12:01AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/30/wto.india.
24.

Stewart, supranote 23.

25. World
Trade
Organization,
USTR.GOv,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Chapter/20H`%20The%20World%2OTrade%200rganization.pdf
26. Early years -from Singapore to Doha, supranote 22; see also Negotiating An Agreement on
Trade
Facilitation,
WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tradfae/tradfa-negoti_e.htm.

27. World Trade Organization, supra note 25.
28. Earlyyears -from Singaporeto Doha, supra note 22; see also Negotiating An Agreement on
Trade Facilitation, supra note 26 ("WTO members had achieved a consensus text with 13 articles and a

special section dealing with special and differential treatment provisions. Among the issues addressed
in the Agreement are: norms for the publication of laws, regulations and procedures, including Internet
publication; provision for advance rulings; disciplines on; fees and charges and on penalties; pre-arrival
processing of goods; use of electronic payment; guarantees to allow rapid release of goods; use of
"authorized operators" schemes; procedures for; expedite shipments; faster release of perishable goods;
reduced documents and formalities with common customs standards; promotion of the use of a single
window; uniformity in border procedures; temporary admission of goods; simplified transit procedures;
provisions for customs cooperation and coordination.").
29. Doha Development Agenda, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/euand-wto/doha-development-agenda/.
30. Trade
Facilitation,
WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tradfa_e/tradfa-e.htm.

3 1. The WTO Can, supra note 1.
32. Protectionism,
INVESTOPEDIA.COM,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/protectionism.asp#ixzz4ZCCURiRx
("Protectionism" refers to
"government actions and policies that restrict or restrain international trade, often done with the intent

of protecting local businesses and jobs from foreign competition. Typical methods of protectionism are
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Depression, that began in 1929, caused competing states "to raise trade barriers
and protect domestic production and employment[,]" which contributed to an
impoverished international market.33 The Great Depression was ruinous for trade,
jobs, and industries, as the value of world trade-$3 billion USD in 1929-crashed
to $1 billion USD by March 1933.34
After the WTO's creation, its goals centered around stabilizing world
economies and keeping markets open in the face of economic crisis. The WTO was
partially credited with stabilizing the world economy in the wake of the 2007
financial crisis, despite domestic pressure on governments to succumb to
protectionist policies. 35 Protectionism in domestic state policies has not
disappeared, as evidenced in India's 2008 government, the United States' 2017
leadership, and in indigenous communities. India and the United States struggled
36
to agree on trade facilitation mechanisms regarding agriculture. As international
7
criticism of India's domestic agriculture policies began to surface, the more
India's domestic citizenry began to agree that "the WTO issue is a relic of India's
past with anti-trade bias."" Moreover, the previously-held belief that India was
39
singled out by the WTO was abandoned in popular rhetoric. While the attitude in
India's government changed from protectionist to pragmatic in conformity with the
global trend, the United States' 2017 policies abandoned liberalized trade in favor
of protectionism.
On January 23, 2015, the United States, through its then-existing Trade

tariffs and quotas on imports and subsidies or tax cuts granted to local businesses. The primary
objective of protectionism is to make local businesses or industries more competitive by increasing the
price or restricting the quantity of imports entering the country.").
33. The WTO Can, supranote 1.
34. Id.; see also World Trade Statistical Review 2016, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
(stating that as of 2015,
https://www.wto.org/english/res-e/statise/wts20l6_e/wts2O16_e.pdf
merchandise exports of WTO members totaled $16.2 trillion USD).
35. The WTO Can, supra note 1; see also Matthieu Bussiere et al., ProtectionistResponses to the
BANK)
CENTRAL
(EUROPEAN
Implications
and
Trends
Global
Crisis:
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp Il0.pdf?a9e5d9a3d7fab9edc635261bb6dcblde
("[E]vidence from surveys shows that public pressure for more economic protection has been mounting
since the mid-2000s, and has possibly intensified since the start of the financial crisis. However, no
World Trade Organization (WTO) member has retreated into widespread trade restrictions or
protectionism to date.").
36. See Eric Bellman & Rajesh Roy, India Threatens to Block WTO Deal, WALL STREET
JOuRNAL (July 17, 2014, 11:58AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/india-threatens-to-block-wto-dealover-food-stockpiling-1405612719.
37. Tim Worstall, India Threatens to Derail WTO Deal Stockholding of Food; A Policy It Should
Change
Anyway,
FORBES
(July
26,
2014,
3:10AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2014/07/26/india-threatens-to-derail-wto-deal-over-publicstockholding-of-food-a-policy-it-should-change-anyway/#58Ocee3O4aeb (stating India's food for the
poor system was described as "a great steaming dungpile of corruption and inefficiency.").
38. Why
is
India Opposing
the
Trade Facilitation Agreement?,
QUORA,
https://www.quora.com/Why-is-India-opposing-the-Trade-Facilitation-Agreement.
39. Id. ("India buying huge amount of wheat and rice from farmers at highly unsustainable prices
and then finding it rot in the non-existent godowns (thereby distorting prices for everyone else)" was
deemed problematic); Worstall, supra note 37.
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Representative Michael Froman, formally accepted the TFA citing its positive
aspects for expedient trade.40 This formal affirmation was confirmed by the WTO
Director-General Roberto Azevedo on January 28, 2015.41 The United States'
acceptance was not merely based on global potential gains. The United States also
encouraged speedy implementation of the TFA by offering to help developing
nations implement TFA's policies. 42 In December 2016, United States Ambassador
Michael Punke confirmed the United States' "commitment to open markets and to
the rules-based multilateral trading system embodied in the WTO." 43
Despite Ambassador Punke's declaration that the United States continued to
dedicate itself to open borders and multilateral pragmatism at the end of 2016, by
January 2017, new leadership proved itself to be wholly protectionist. For
example, on January 24, 2017, an executive order ended the United States'
involvement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP);" an action diametrically
opposed to Ambassador Punke's address to the WTO Trade Policy Review, which
heralded the United States' "vigorous pursuit of bilateral and regional
arrangements aimed at reinforcing and complementing the multilateral trading
system." 45
Thus far, the United States' 2017 protectionist policies have both destroyed an
opportunity for involvement in the TPP 46 and directly contravened its officially
stated commitment to pragmatic multilateralism 47 in favor of imposing high
tariffs. 4 8 It is these protectionist steps, combined with a threat to "pull out" of the

40. United States Takes Final Step Toward WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2015/january/united-states-takes-final-step ("Michael Froman formally delivered the United
States' letter of acceptance of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement to WTO Director General

Roberto Azev6do today in Davos, Switzerland.").
41. Protocol Amending the Marrakesh Agreement, Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Done at Geneva on 27 November 2014, Agreement on Trade Facilitation, Notification of Acceptance;

WT/Let/1029.
42. United States Takes Final Step Toward WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, supra note 40
("We are working with developing countries to help support effective implementation of this
Agreement," [...] "In fact, we are already considering how to best support countries who are committed
to implementation-teaming up with other governments and the private sector.").

43. Ambassador Michael Punke, Statement of the United States at the 13th WTO Trade Policy
Review of the United States of America (Dec. 19, 2016), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pressoffice/speechestranscripts/2016/december/Statement-US- 13-WTO-TPR-USA.
44. Charles Riley, Trump's Decision to Kill TPP Leaves Door Open for China, CNN MONEY
(Jan. 24, 2017, 6:31 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/23/news/economy/tpp-trump-china/.
45. Ambassador Michael Punke, supranote 43.
46. Id. ("According to analysis supported by the Peterson Institute for International Economics, if

TPP were implemented, global exports would increase (compared to the baseline) by US $ 1.1 trillion
(2015 dollars) by 2030, and global real income would increase by US $ 492 billion.").
47. Id. (stating "this multilateral system is so vitally important to" the United States of America).

48. Patrick Gillespie, NAFTA: What it is, and Why Trump Hates It, CNN MONEY (Nov. 15, 2016,
5:17PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/11/15/news/economy/trump-what-is-nafta/ ("Top of Trump's
wish list is to renegotiate or "terminate" NAFTA-the North American Free Trade Agreement. He also
wants to slap a 35% tax on goods, such as Ford (F) cars, that are made in Mexico and sold in the U.S.").
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WTO, 49 that indicate "Donald Trump is prepared to risk precipitating a trade war"
that creates worry.5 0 Considering the current United States trade policies, it is
ironic that the United States "became one of the first countries to try to reverse"
5
the 1930's global protectionist movement. ' Trade regimes and peace are
interrelated. When trade barriers become insurmountable, war is imminent.
Faith in liberalized multilateral pragmatism may win out over protectionism;
for, at the end of the day, TFA is fully entered in force, and creates certain rights
and obligations on its signatories.

IV.

THE TRADE FACILITATION AGREEMENT

The TFA is comprised of three main sections. Section I of the TFA (Section I)
tells us that this agreement is binding and requires a commitment to use "best
endeavors" 52 to enforce the TFA.53 Section I covers: publication and availability of
information; disciplines and fees about importation and exportation penalties;
border agency cooperation, release, and clearance of goods; enhancing nondiscrimination and transparency; goods under custom's control; formalities in
54
importing and exporting; freedom of transit; and customs cooperation.
Interestingly, the Section I standard is applied to developing and leastdeveloped countries on a sliding scale. This sliding scale, covered in Section II,
allows for "special and differential treatment" provisions that may be invoked by
nations that qualify as developing or least-developed. Section II of the TFA creates
three categories of nations that qualify as developing or least-developed countries
and various ways to implement the TFA. 5 5 Section II allows such countries to
unilaterally determine when to "apply the various provisions laid out in Section
I."16 However, Section II also informs applicable states how to notify the
Committee of the stage or progress on TFA implementation." Moreover, Section
II discusses the methods available to change categories between A, B, or C, and
8
how to seek support on implementing the TFA at various stages.

49. Todd N. Tucker, What would be the consequences of pulling out of the WTO?, TODD N.
TUCKER: UNDER Two CEILINGS (July 26, 2016, 3:23PM), https://toddntucker.com/2016/07/26/what-

would-be-the-consequences-of-pulling-out-of-the-wto/.
50. John Plender, Trump Trade Blind to Global Cost of Protectionism, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan.

31, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/2bee373a-e786-l1 e6-893c-082c54a7f539.
51. Kyle Bagwell, Robert W. Staiger, & Alan 0. Sykes, Border Instruments, in LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES OF WORLD TRADE LAW 29 (Cambridge University Press 2013).
52. Best Endeavors, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/best-endeavors.asp
(Best endeavors is "[a] term commonly found in commercial contracts, that places upon the party given

such an undertaking, the obligation to use all efforts necessary to fulfill it. "Best endeavors" places a
party under a stricter obligation than "reasonable endeavors.").
53. Hoekman, supra note 5.

54. Agreement
on
Trade
Facilitation,
WT/L/931
(July
http://tfig.unece.org/pdf files/931.pdf [hereinafter Trade Facilitation Agreement].
55. Id. § II, art. 14.
56.
57.

Hoekman, supra note 5.
Trade Facilitation Agreement, supranote 54, § H, art. 15-18.

58. Id

II, art. 19-22.

15,

2014),
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Section III covers institutional arrangements for an international and domestic
Committee on Trade Facilitation, including its roles, obligations, and how to
conduct meetings." This is followed by final provisions including notice that the
TFA's provisions are binding on all members, and that members are bound to
resolve disputes as outlined in Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994.60
This section discusses the TFA by highlighting: (A) the TFA's projected
beneficial effects, (B) the Global Alliance, (C) implementing the TFA, and (D)
regulating and enforcing the TFA in the face of protectionism. These sections are
intended to explore some of the more unique aspects of this multilateral agreement,
and whether these qualities create an agreement that can overcome protectionism.
A.

ProjectedEffects of the TFA

The projected monetary benefits of TFA implementation are staggering: the
TFA is estimated to reduce global trade costs from 12.5% to 17.5%.61 A study
from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
claimed a mere "[one] percent drop could save as much as $40 billion in trade
costs." 6 2 This is a monumental amount of monies that will predominately benefit

low to lower middle income countries and increase their opportunity to participate
in trade.63 In a 2016 report by the International Trade Center (ITC), in connection
with United Nations Network of Experts for Paperless Trade and Transport in Asia
and the Pacific (UNNExT) and the United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN ESCAP) division, the TFA was
described as benefitting income distribution and small and medium enterprises
(SME)." Moreover, it is posited that the TFA "will also help developing countries
attract more FDI (Foreign Direct Investment), increase customs revenues and
reduce the incidence of corruption." 65
B.

The Global Alliance for Trade Facilitation'sRole

The Global Alliance for Trade Facilitation (GATF) consists of three major

59. Id. § M, art. 23-24.
60. Id.
61. Implementation of the WTO Trade FacilitationAgreement: The PotentialImpact on Trade
Costs (OECD), https://www.oecd.org/trade/WTO-TF-Implementation-Policy-Brief EN 2015 06.pdf
[Implementation of the WTO TFA] ("The potential cost reduction from a "full" implementation of the
TFA is 16.5% of total costs for low income countries, 17.4% for lower-middle income countries, 14.6%
for upper-middle income countries and 11.8% for OECD countries according to 2015 TFI data." "If
countries limit themselves to the mandatory provisions of the agreement, the potential reduction reaches
12.6% for LICs, 13.7% for LMICs, 12.8% for UMICs and 10.4% for OECD countries.").
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Making the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement Work for SMEs: Mainstreaming Trade
Facilitation
in
SME
Development
Strategies,
ST/ESCAP/2748,
http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/MakingWTOTFAWorkforSMEs.pdf.
65. Mr. David Shark, Deputy Director-General, World Trade Organization, Statement on Benefits
of
the
WTO's
Trade
Facilitation
Agreement,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/acc-e/TJKDDGSHARKTICTFASTATEMENT.pdfI
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private sector organizations: (1) the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC);
66
(2) the United States Chamber of Commerce-affiliated Center for International
67
Private Enterprise (CIPE); and (3) the World Economic Forum (WEF). The
United States Chamber of Commerce took a leading role in support of the TFA,
which led to its formal adoption." Garnering the full potential of a multilateral
agreement on the TFA's scale required the government, private sector, TFA
69
members, and IGO's to work together for a common goal. Developed nations
including the governments of Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the
United States created the GATF alongside private sector international
organizations.70 GATF partners worked diligently and closely to craft a "unique
public-private platform to leverage business expertise, leadership and resources to
support effective trade facilitation reforms measured by real-world business
metrics."'
Rather than being an enforcement mechanism on the back-end of potential
TFA disputes, the GATF is tasked with creative problem solving in TFA
implementation from the beginning. Having such support on the front-end of
implementing the TFA's ambitious goals could quell many foreseeable problems
with TFA compliance before issues of corruption or faulty implementation could
arise. The GATF, on the front-end, thus promotes proper implementation and
72
makes the TFA more self-enforcing than was previously thought.
C.

Implementation

The ICC argues that implementing the TFA's potential for maximum
beneficial results can be a smooth transition if domestic governments make the
following four key points- "business engagement, ambition, speed and a coherent
approach to implementation" 73 -permanently at the top of their respective agendas.
The ICC has repeatedly emphasized that businesses and governments must work

66. Advance Trade Facilitation, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Aug. 15, 2017, 9:00PM),
https://www.uschamber.com/issue-brief/advance-trade-facilitation.
67. See About the Alliance, TRADE FACILITATION, http://www.tradefacilitation.org/about-the-

alliance.html.
68. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE: WTO TRADE FACILITATION AGREEMENT
http://www.iccwbo.org/advocacy-codes-and-rules/areas-of-work/customs-and-trade(TFA),
facilitation/wto-trade-facilitation-agreement-(tfa)/.
69. Advance Trade Facilitation, U.S. CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE (Aug. 15, 2017, 9:00PM),
https://www.uschamber.com/issue-brief/advance-trade-facilitation.

70.

Id.

71. Id.; see also INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE: WTO TRADE FACILITATION
AGREEMENT (TFA), supra note 68.

72. Hoekman, supra note 5 ("The weakness of the TFA in terms of offering foreign export
interests strong mechanisms to enforce its provisions and thus to make the TFA self-enforcing means
other institutional arrangements can and must be used to support implementation, including regional
integration arrangements and concerted action by multilateral development agencies. The epistemic
community that supported the TFA effort does not need the WTO to continue to provide support to
governments and stakeholders that aims to improve trade facilitation performance.").
73. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE: WTO TRADE FACILITATION AGREEMENT
(TFA), supranote 68.
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together "to cement opportunities the TFA will bring for development, job creation
and poverty reduction." 74 With the GATF and Trade Facilitation Agreement
Facility (TFAF)7 1 poised to help countries design implementation of the TFA,
these resources are likely to create a smooth and organized partial or full
implementation.
There are three categories of provisions that apply to different countries based
on their needs and stage of economic development: Category A, Category B, and
Category C. 76 Category A contains provisions that a developing country or a leastdeveloped country members to the TFA designate for implementation once the
TFA is entered into force. 77 In the case of a least-developed country member,
implementation must begin within one year after, which is February 22, 2018.71
Category B contains provisions allowing developing or least-developed countries
to designate "for implementation on a date after a transitional period of time
following" the TFA's entry into force. 79 Category C contains provisions similar to
Category B, with the additional requirement that Category C states acquire the
capacity to implement the TFA with assistance or support for capacity building."o
Such support "may take the form of technical, financial, or any other mutually
agreed form of assistance provided."8" The TFAF's Work Plan for 2017 has nine
major tasks: (1) match Category C countries with developed nations; (2) create a
grant funding program; (3) create and facilitate national workshops on
implementing the TFA; (4) create regional workshops similar to (3); (5) assessing
national needs; (6) create dedicated thematic workshops; (7) educate chairs of
national trade facilitation committees; (8) include training materials on the TFAF
website; and (9) facilitate outreach and promotional activities for the TFA.8 2
The TFA as implemented has already circumvented some difficulties that
countries, like Brazil, faced in changing domestic laws that encouraged trade
facilitation measures. The difficulty historically arose between the competing
interests of businesses that want simple, streamlined procedures for trade, and
governments, which willingly adopt strict foreign trade measures." WTO
74. Id.
75. About the Facility, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.tfafacility.org/about-thefacility (The TFAF was "created at the request of developing and least-developed country (LDC)
Members to help ensure that they receive the assistance they need to reap the full benefits of the Trade
Facilitation Agreement, and to support the ultimate goal of full implementation of this new Agreement
by all Members.").
76. Trade Facilitation Agreement, supranote 54, § II, art. 14.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Workplan 2017, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.tfafacility.org/workplan-2017.
83. Jose Marcio R. Rego Filho, The Importance of the Agreement on Trade Facilitationto Brazil
and the World Economy, 26 J. INT'L TAX'N 52, 53 (Jun. 2015); see also INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE: WTO TRADE FACILITATION AGREEMENT (TFA), supra note 68 ("A report from the

Peterson Institute for International Economics commissioned by the ICC Research Foundation
estimates that the TFA has the potential to deliver an unprecedented stimulus to the word economy with
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agreements are binding on those states who are members, and supersede domestic
authority in principle. Jos6 Mdrcio Rego Filho, an associate with the Tax and
International Trade Area of Pinheiro Neto Advogados, in Sao Paulo, Brazil argues
the WTO's TFA will inherently prevent local authorities from discretionary trade
facilitation procedures or costs, and further posits:
[E]xecution of the Agreement will not only bring direct benefits to the
world economy [...] but also give new impetus to the WTO, creating a
more favorable environment for negotiations of more complex and
divergent matters, all of which is of utmost importance in enhancing the
economic development of all WTO member countries.84
Because of observable positive results in Brazil's implementation, the TFA
appears to be a beneficial and innovative mechanism to promote trade while
fostering necessary certainty.

D.

TFA Regulation andEnforcement Despite Protectionism

The optimism surrounding the TFA should duly be met with skepticism as an
agreement must be enforceable to have teeth." A key consideration, then, must be
how to ensure businesses and governments adhere to the TFA's policies to reap its
benefits with confidence. The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) involvement
could add teeth to the WTO's agreements, as the IMF's rules in combination with
"WTO Agreements provide the legal basis for cooperation."" Over the last decade,
drastic changes occurred in IMF and WTO global strategies from its policies in the
1990's that garnered criticism. To do this, it will be important to know whether
there are mechanisms that can deter protectionist acts, or create binding
consequences for noncompliance with the TFA. As Ambassador Punke noted:
WTO Members cannot have confidence in a system where WTO
adjudicators overstep the boundaries agreed by WTO Members in the
And if Members do not have
DSU and the WTO Agreement.
confidence that the WTO dispute settlement system will not add to or
diminish their existing rights and obligations under agreements they
have approved domestically, they will not have confidence that they can
conclude new agreements and credibly say domestically what those new
87
agreements mean.
Essentially, the concern is whether nations will commit to "the legally binding
limits on their trade barriers and subsidies that they have also negotiated" if the
a boost of up to US$I trillion.").
84. Fitho, supra note 83, at 53 ("[A]ccording to the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),
once implemented, the agreement could boost global trade by as much as U.S.$1 trillion and lead to a
10% reduction in trade costs...").
85. Have Teeth, FREEDICTIONARY.COM, http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/have+teeth (To
"have teeth" a law "it has the power to make people obey it.").
86. Deborah E. Siegel, Legal Aspects of the IMF/WTO Relationship: The Fund's Articles of
Agreement and the WTO Agreements, 96 AMERICAN J. INT'L LAW 561, 569,
https://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/siegel.pdf.
87. Ambassador Michael Punke, supra note 43.
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available dispute settlement systems neither add to nor diminish rights and
obligations." The VTO acknowledges that dispute settlement mechanisms is "the
central pillar of the multilateral trading system," because absent a "means of
settling disputes, the rules-based system would be less effective because the rules
could not be enforced."" Thus, the WTO's official stance lies in enforceable hard
law,90 but only after negotiations between disputing states take place.9' According
to economic and legal scholars, the WTO's "dispute settlement system is widely
considered one of the most successful international resolution systems."92
However, because the WTO inherently relies on state consent,93 thus, "even its
hard-law texts contain certain forms of wording that locate them at the soft-law
end of the spectrum, where effective litigation is difficult or impossible." 94
The WTO's binding agreements usually pertain to "transparency, fees and
procedures that are imposed or applied by customs authorities[,]" rather than by
blanket governmental leadership authorities." Importantly, many scholars consider
WTO obligations non-binding "in an international law sense[,]" though the WTO
includes a branch that, by its name, would seem to encompass non-complianceDispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). 6 Some TFA "provisions can in
principle be enforced through the WTO dispute settlement system. Others are of a
"best endeavors nature" that is inherently subjective or "soft law[.]"" Best
endeavors-type matters will include sensitive matters "e.g., [c]ustoms cooperation

88. The WTO Can, supra note I ("WTO agreements require governments to make their trade
policies transparent by notifying the WTO about laws in force and measures adopted.").
89. A
Unique
Contribution,
WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis e/tif e/disp1_e.htm.
90. The WTO Can, supra note I ("The WTO is mostly about hard law."); see also Patrick Low,
Hard Law and Soft Law: Optionsfor Fostering InternationalCooperation, http://el5initiative.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/E15-Services-Low-FINAL.pdf ("The main body of the WTO Agreement sets
out justiciable laws and procedures, and in this sense is an international legal contract.").
91. A Unique Contribution, supra note 89 ("First stage: consultation (up to 60 days). Before
taking any other actions the countries in dispute have to talk to each other to see if they can settle their
differences by themselves. If that fails, they can also ask the WTO director-general to mediate or try to
help in any other way.")
92. Low, supra note 90 ("Intergovernmental contracts may encounter even more difficulty in this
regard because political and commercial interests are blended and shape outcomes in ways that are less
frequently encountered in private contracts." Moreover, "even if the WTO dispute settlement system
has justifiably earned a reputation for effectiveness, this is against a background where enforcement
relies in no small part on state consent. Punishment mechanisms for non-compliance are largely limited
to trade retaliation and the withdrawal of equivalent concessions. Retaliatory options are highly
circumscribed in disputes between small and large countries because of the size disparity.")
93. Id. ("justiciable hard law rests on fragile foundations because the law is international, not
national. It applies among sovereignties. Enforcement mechanisms are circumscribed and rely heavily
on state consent").
94. Id.
95. Hoekman, supra note 5, (emphasis added); see also Ambassador Michael Punke, supra note
43.
96. Siegel,
supra
note
86,
at
564,
https://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/siegel.pdf.
97. Hoekman, supra note 5.
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and exchange of information, something on which there were and are concerns by
developed countries and not just developing economies[,]" "activities of other
government agencies at the border." 98
Multilateral agreements are no longer about enforcement. Rather, multilateral
agreements focus on parties volunteering. This follows studies in social behavior
99
that volunteering participation is more effective than mandatory rules. The
current understanding of the TFA is that upon its implementation, "enforcement is
left to the standard WTO mechanisms, including greater transparency for domestic
consumers, the operation of the TFA Committee[.]" 0 However, "many of the
provisions of the TFA are not self-enforcing" as it relies on the WTO's DSU
system.'o' The United States formally heralded international agreements as a way
of achieving the "greatest economic benefits offered by the global trading
system[,]" but only if all trading partners are required to "abide by their
02
commitments and play by agreed upon rules."
Despite threats of protectionism from the current United States
administration, it would be difficult for the United States to do so without violating
certain obligations to its own people, not to mention its international obligations. 0 3
The United States' Foreign Affairs Manual on Treaties and Other International
Agreements states that to terminate an agreement to which the United States is a
party:
Terminations of treaties or other international agreements are not to be
undertaken, nor any exploratory discussions undertaken with
representatives of another government or international organization,
until authorized by the Secretary or an officer specifically authorized by
the Secretary for that purpose.0
Regarding termination of an international agreement, termination cannot
unilaterally occur unless formal authorization is established for such termination,
and all interested government agencies have the opportunity to express their
opinion.'o Moreover, there is no definitive determination on whether the President

98. Id
99. June O'Keeffe & Elina Villup, The WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement: Reducing
Bureaucracy

at

the

Border

(EUROPEAN

PARLIAMENT),

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegDataletudes/BRIE/2015/549046/EXPO BRI(2015)549046_EN.pdf.
100. Hoekman, supra note 5.
10 1. Id.
102. Ambassador Michael Punke, supra note 43.
103. Tucker, supra note 49 (For example, the current President of the United States could create
higher tariffs on Chinese imports, but he would "almost assuredly face a challenge at the dispute
settlement body if he tried to do so, as it is a blatant violation of most-favored nation rules. (For this
reason, the policy would also probably be ineffective and likely lead to more imports from third
countries.)").
104. Foreign
Affairs
Manual,
(CT:POL-44;
05-26-2006),
11
FAM
724.8,
https://fam.state.gov/search?query-withdrawal&category-FAM%5C I FAM&src= 11%20FAM&filtervolumenum%7cl 1.
105. Id. (A Circular 175 memorandum (as well as accompanying documents) should be prepared
that takes into account the views of the relevant government agencies and interested bureaus within the
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of the United States has such unilateral authority to terminate multilateral treaties
and agreements.'
The current administration, in theory, could "ask the U.S.
Congress to repeal the TFA's ratification and withdraw[,]" but this would be a
deplorable action.o 7 Some industries have already felt the crushing effects of the
United States' decision to remove itself from the TPP.I It is evident, at least from
the excessive, needless financial losses the Texas agriculture industry is incurring,
that withdrawing from such multilateral agreements serves to crush opportunities
for United States wealth.1 09
If the United States breaches its TFA obligations, WTO member nations may
punish the United States through sanctions, as "the WTO is not so much a global
government as it is a framework for structuring retaliation" or, in the alternative,
disregard
the
United
States
as
a
global
economic
powerhouse
entirely.'" Noncompliance or withdrawal from an IGO, however, is currently
untested:
Members will remain bound, however, by conventions adopted by
international organizations which they have separately ratified... like

international treaties, binding decisions of international organizations
seek to create rules of law-the continuing applicability of which may
not be unilaterally denied. On the other hand, a legal obligation to

comply with binding decisions may no longer be felt once the member
has withdrawn. It will also be difficult for the organization to supervise
compliance with such decisions. International sanctions will no longer
be possible."'"
It remains to be seen whether the United States will continue to "place an
unprecedented emphasis on enforcement of existing trade agreements.""12
Alternatively, an IGO's scope and binding reach may become definitively
determined to answer whether withdrawal from an IGO releases a former member

Department (including the Office of the Legal Adviser (L) and the Bureau of Legislative Affairs)).
106. David M. Ackerman, Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty: Legal Considerations,
http://congressionalresearch.com/RS21088/document.php?study-Withdrawal+from+the+ABM+Treaty
+Legal+Considerations ("Nonetheless, it remains the case that there has not been a final judicial
determination of the constitutional parameters governing the termination of treaties.").
107. Alejandro Reyes, Force - and the U.S. is a Part of It, TIME (Feb. 26, 2017),
http://time.com/4683483/trump-trade-facilitation-agreement/.
108. Courtney Gilmore, Trump's Policy on Trade Costing Cattle Ranchers Thousands Each Day,
NBCDFW.ORG,
http://www.nbcdfw.com/news/business/Trumps-Policy-on-Trade-Costing-CattleRanchers-Thousands-Each-Day-415319203.html (Texas cattle, which "leads the nation with a total
number of 248,800 farms and ranches, covering 130.2 million acres" are incurring a loss of over
$400,000.00 USD per day.).
109. Id
I10. Tucker, supranote 49.
111. Termination of Membership: Withdrawal: Withdrawal Based on Constitution in
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OR INSTITUTIONS, MEMBERSHIP (Henry Schermers & Niels M.
Blokker 2008), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/l10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690e505 [hereinafter Termination of Membership].
112. Ambassador Michael Punke, supra note 43.
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from prior binding decisions under that organization's rules." 3
In sum, WTO members may find that the United States' involvement in
international trade is unnecessary, which would make trade with the United States
both irrelevant and expensive. Thus, while "[p]ulling out of the WTO should not
be feared for any necessary economic fallout. The U.S. and world could get by just
fine" but, the potential chain reaction in retaliation from WTO member nations and
the WTO's DSU mechanism could cause it problems for international
diplomacy.' 14 It is not possible to determine whether the WTO's DSU's will
effectively address a breach under the TFA until and unless a dispute arises. But,
the United States may be the first nation to discover whether the TFA has the teeth
necessary to bring a WTO member into compliance. There may be cause for
optimism as-to date-protectionism and populist governments are no match for
international multilateral obligations.'s
V.

NON-PROTECTIONIST CRITIQUES OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS

The widely-accepted theory is superbly elegant in its simplicity-trade is a
conduit for peace."' The thought behind this theory is that bilateral and
multilateral trade limits the incentive for a state to instigate international conflict
because of the dependence created between two or more nations for resources
provided through such trade.'" However, a widely-accepted idea is not necessarily
a fact.'" There are three major issues raised by economists, political scientists, and
scholars around WTO agreements: (1) DSU enforcement; (2) whether globalized
trade effectuates peace; and (3) whether WTO agreement benefits reach the
developing and least developed nations as intended.
The first major issue with WTO agreements generally is regarding WTO DSU
enforcement. There could be a lack of consensus on what a WTO enforcement
means in practice, as the WTO DSU's appellate body appears to be more of a gap
filler for instances negotiating governmental bodies lack the mechanisms to resolve
disputes.'"'

The second is whether such multilateral agreements create peace. Economists,
political scientists, and scholars have created formulas to test the theory that trade
creates peace. 2 0 The results can seem counterintuitive to the standard 'trade equals

113. Termination of Membership, supra note 111; Ambassador Michael Punke, supra note 43.
114. Tucker, supra note 49.
115. The WTO Can, supra note I ("Trade rules.. .deter protectionism.").
116. Ju Hyun Pyun & Jong-Wha Lee, Globalisation Promotes Peace, VOX (Mar. 21, 2009),
http://voxeu.org/article/globalisation-promotes-peace.
117. Id.
118. Fact, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/fact ("A
thing that is known or proved to be true.").
119. Tucker, supra note 49.
120. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Alexander H. Montgomery, War, Trade, and Distrust: Why Trade
Agreements

Don't Always

Keep

the

Peace, 29

http://pages.ucsd.edu/-ehafner/pdfs/Paper Hafner-

CONFLICT

MGMT.

&

PEACE

SC.

257,
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peace' theory, depending on the variables used in the experiment:
While there are a group of states that fulfill the conditions for the liberal
peace, for many states at the fringes, membership [in international trade
institutions, like PTAs and the WTO]l 2 1 can actually increase conflict
by defining hierarchies of access centrality and dependence that cause
conflict with those at the bottom of those hierarchies.1 22
Overall, however, the consensus is that there is less truth in a black-or-white
theory of trade creating peace. Rather, bilateral and multilateral trade is likely to
induce certain types of peace (i.e. stable political relations), while other types of
conflict are negatively influenced by such agreements:
Trade globalization also affects the nature of war: Multilateral openness
increases the probability of local wars but should deter global
conflicts.. Our model and empirical results also suggest that regional
and bilateral trade agreements which foster regional and bilateral trade
flows may have positive consequences for political relations. The
positive political implications of these agreements may become even
more important as multilateral trade flows increase.1 23
One variable to consider is the effect of tariffs, that have historically crippled
the positive aspects of global trade when left unchecked.1 24 Bilateral and
multilateral agreements preceding the TFA could not overcome tariffs even
through free trade agreements, multilateral trade agreements, or bilateral treaties,
as no formal multilateral agreement through the WTO existed until the TFA.1 25
The third major problem with WTO agreements is that they may not
necessarily reach certain least-developed nations that could potentially benefit
from the agreements. Indigenous communities from all parts of the globe find the
WTO's efforts do not protect indigenous peoples, who are largely recognized as
some of the most impoverished groups in the world.1 26 Groups like the Asia
Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP) go so far as to claim the WTO violates the rights
of indigenous peoples.1 27 Indigenous criticism of the WTO stems from the
indigenous peoples' desire to be formally domestically and internationally
recognized as sovereign because "[u]ntil [indigenous persons'] right to selfBurtonWar%20Trade%20and%2ODistrust_2012.pdf.
121. Id. at 273.
122. Id; see also Philippe Martin, Thierry Mayer, & Mathias Thoenig, Make Trade Not War?, 75
REv. OF
ECON. STUD.
865
(2008),
http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/docs/koenigpamina/martinmayerthoenig.pdf.
123. Philippe Martin, Thierry Mayer, & Mathias Thoenig, supra note 122.
124. World Trade, Tariffs, and War Debts, CQ RESEARCHER (Oct. 5, 1932),
http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrrel932100500.
125. WTO's Trade Facilitation Agreement enters into force, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/newsl7_e/fac 31janl7 e.htm (stating it was the first multilateral
deal concluded in the 21-year history of the World Trade Organization).
126. Declaration: The World Trade Organization (WTO) and Indigenous Peoples: Resisting
Globalization, Asserting Self-Determination, AIPPNET.ORG, http://aippnet.org/declaration-the-worldtrade-organization-wto-and-indigenous-peoples-resisting-globalization-asserting-self-determination/.
127. Id.
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determination is respected, genuine sustainable development will not be
achieved."' 28 Thus, the TFA's benefits may not reach a large population of leastdeveloped economies within indigenous communities, which is problematic
pursuant to its stated goals.
The problematic aspects of WTO agreements are legitimate concerns.
However, it is difficult to imagine that a twenty-two-year-old mechanism will
perfectly resolve the major issues that have always plagued peace and trade. WTO
agreements like the TFA, while imperfect solutions, appear to largely benefit the
WTO's stated goals. Thus, the TFA's benefits most realistically and pragmatically
outweigh its more problematic aspects.
VI. CONCLUSION

Based on structures and hierarchies of international law, bilateral and regional
agreements countries may create should "inform it and to spur [the TFA] on to
action" rather than hinder continued bilateral and multilateral treaties between
groups of nations.' 29 It remains to be seen whether the United States' engagement
in the Global Alliance could be affected; however, it is likely if the United States
determines to leave the WTO entirely, that there could be a hole left in the Global
Alliance' 3 0 that could severely hinder TFA implementation, at least, initially.
In conclusion, the TFA's inherent structure and adoption that supersedes
previous tariff structure could, perhaps, encourage a more peaceful and
economically sound world.' 3 ' Whether the United States' current administration
chooses to continue to neglect its obligations under treaty law, withdraw from the
WTO which it helped create and foster, or economically deplete its own people,
the TFA will likely overcome such a setback and continue to be a beneficial
mechanism for the world economy.' 32 While it could be a stretch to stipulate that
the TFA will be a direct cause of world peace, it is reasonable to find that this
pragmatic multilateral trade agreement will invariably benefit the global economy
for those states that choose to adopt it. Thus, the global economy under the TFA's
guidance and structure should at least be a cause for optimism in an uncertain time
for the world economy overall.

128. Id.
129. Ambassador Michael Punke, supra note 43.
130. Id. (stating "it is no exaggeration to say that the openness of the U.S. economy to goods and
services is one of the most important sources of global economic stability" as of December 2016).
13 1. Tucker, supra note 49.
I32. Id.

